An Experimental Comparison Between Free Negotiation and a Multi-issue Point Mechanism by Hortala-Vallve, Rafael et al.
DIVISION OF THE HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES
CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
PASADENA, CALIFORNIA 91125
AN EXPERIMENTAL COMPARISON BETWEEN FREE NEGOTIATION
AND MULTI-ISSUE POINT MECHANISM
Rafael Hortala-Vallve
London School of Economics
Aniol Llorente-Saguer
California Institute of Technology
Rosemarie Nagel
Universitat Pompeu Fabra
1 8 9 1
CA
LI
F
O
R
N
IA
 
IN
S T
IT U T E O F
 T E C
H
N
O
LO
G
Y
SOCIAL SCIENCE WORKING PAPER 1336
May 2010
 An Experimental Comparison 
Between Free Negotiation and 
a Multi-issue Point Mechanism 
 
Rafael Hortala-Vallve 
London School of Economics 
 Aniol Llorente-Saguer 
Caltech 
 Rosemarie Nagel 
Universitat Pompeu Fabra 
 
May 2010 
 
 
 
Abstract 
We propose a multi-issue point mechanism to be used in conflict resolution 
situations. This mechanism extract “gains from trade” inherent in the differing 
valuation towards the various issues where conflict exists. In order to assess the 
performance of this mechanism vis-a-vis unconstrained communication, we run a 
series of controlled laboratory experiments and find that both mechanisms reach 
similar levels of welfare, but the multi issue point mechanism allows subjects to 
reach an agreement more swiftly. In order to analyse in detail the performance of 
both mechanisms we introduce a classical measure of conflict and see that when 
conflict is highest, free negotiation sustains most losses: (1) subjects need more 
time to reach an agreement; (2) the likelihood of gridlock (no agreement) increases. 
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1 Introduction 
 
Negotiations between two parties are an important recurring element in our lives. Buyer and seller, political 
parties setting the agenda, an international dispute, a bilateral agreement in arms/pollution reduction, a country 
with two legislative chambers governed by opposing parties or a clash between the management and the 
union of a particular firm, are just a few examples.  The process, outcome and success of  negotiations depend 
on the characteristics of the setup.  
 
One of the key characteristics in any negotiation is the number of items over which disagreement exists 
Whenever negotiations occur in a single dimension (such as setting the price in a buyer/seller transaction)  
gains for one party are losses for the other party. Instead, negotiations with multiple dimensions allow strict 
Pareto improvements. In such situations parties need to “assess tradeoffs in terms of how much to give up in 
[...] one issue in order to obtain a specified gain in another issue”1. Precisely, a central aspect in negotiations 
literature is whether negotiating parties can exploit the gains of trade inherent in their different valuation of the 
issues (see for instance Fisher and Ury, and Pattan, 1981, Bazerman and Neale, 1983, Keeney and Raiffa 
(1991), Thompson, 2000).  
 
Motivated by the same idea, there is burgeoning literature on voting rules that allow voters to trade off their 
intensities of preferences in order to influence the final outcome on several issues (see for instance Brams and 
Taylor, 1996 and 1999, Casella, 2005, Jackson & Sonnenschein, 2007, and Hortala-Vallve, 2007). In this 
literature similar mechanisms are discussed applying game theory, in which voters allocate their votes across 
several decisions. By linking decisions, relative intensities across issues are elicited and strict Pareto 
improvements with respect to Majority Rule are realized. 
  
The goal of this paper is to build a link between the literature of the two branches, (free) negotiation and the 
voting literature on multiple issues, and propose the application of a particular voting mechanism as a helpful 
negotiation tool. We design a set of experiments and compare the outcomes reached by free negotiation to 
those obtained with the multi issue point mechanism (hereafter MIPM) where two conflicting parties can 
unilaterally trade off their influence across the various issues at stake.2 We replicate the same situations under 
both negotiating protocols in order to compare and evaluate the advantages of each mechanism. We vary the 
number of dimensions over which conflict exists in order to study the effects of this variable in our 
comparison.  
 
MIPM endows each of the two bargaining party with a budget of votes which each of them has to distribute 
across a set of given issues simultaneously (analogously to the Adjusted Winner and related mechanisms). 
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 Keeney and Raiffa (1991) 
2
 This mechanism is essentially the one proposed in Hortala-Vallve (2009). 
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Conflicting parties have opposing preferences so that one party wants all the issues to be approved and the 
opposing party wants them all to be dismissed. The party that invests most votes on a given issue is decisive 
on that issue. In the case of a tie, the issue is approved or dismissed with equal probability. By unilaterally 
trading off bargaining power from less preferred issues to more preferred issues, parties can extract the gains 
from trade inherent in their differing relative intensities. Throughout each party privately knows his own 
payoff for each issue in case he wins an issue, but does not know the valuations of his opponent.  
 
In free negotiation the parties get the same information but are now allowed to communicate via the computer 
terminals. This allows subjects to send written messages and propose final allocations..  
 
Running our experiments in the laboratory allows us to control and parallel the given information in each 
setting, e.g. preferences, knowledge about each other’s preferences, timing, etc. Moreover, in the free 
negotiation treatments we restrict subjects to communicate in written form by using computer terminals, and 
so a record exists of every single move (e.g. who makes the first offer, how much information is disclosed, 
whether subjects are truthful, etc.) thereby avoiding non-verbal queues which are difficult to measure and 
incorporate in a quantitative analysis. Unlike case studies, we use abstract wordings for issues, e,g. issue 1, 2.. 
and simply present payoff tables indicating the subjects’ earnings when they win an issue.  
 
We first find that the average payoffs reached by subjects in both experimental treatments are similar. This 
alone is noteworthy given that in contrast to free negotiation, there is no direct communication among subjects 
in the MIPM. We also find that when subjects freely negotiate, the time they need to reach an agreement is 
considerably longer than when they use the MIPM. In other words, both mechanisms reach similar outcomes 
but unconstrained negotiation does so in a much more costly manner. The analysis of our experimental 
sessions then focuses on a detailed comparison of both mechanisms and tries to explain the source of our 
results. 
 
One of the novelties of this paper is the application of a classical measure of conflict (Axelrod, 1967) to a 
negotiation situation. This measure captures the gains from trade inherent in any conflicting situations and 
therefore helps to compare very different situations and the two mechanism. In our case it allows to classify 
our observations in terms of the level of conflict regardless of the specific payoffs or the number of issues 
parties are bargaining over. We see that the level of conflict establishes an upper bound on the amount of 
payoff subjects can achieve. Furthermore, in free negotiation, the higher the conflict, the more difficulties 
negotiating parties will have and thus the more time they need in reaching an agreement. We also observe that 
gridlock (no agreement in negotiations) is most likely for high levels of conflict and this is precisely the source 
of payoff difference with the multi issue point mechanism. The lack of communication in the latter mechanism 
avoids parties realizing inherent conflict, and circumvents gridlock by allowing parties to realize the low (but 
existing) gains from trade in a short period of time. 
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The potential application of the voting mechanism as a negotiating tool is appealing as it mimics the heuristics 
that lead to good agreements by inducing integrative bargaining across the various dimensions. Firstly, MIPM 
forces parties to consider all issues simultaneously.3 Secondly, as shown in Hortala-Vallve & Llorente-Saguer 
(2010) where MIPM is extensively analyzed, subjects invest more votes in the issues they care most about and 
by doing so, reach the desirable welfare properties of the mechanism (even when they are far from playing 
equilibrium strategies).  Precisely, our experimental results support the use of MIPM in conflict resolution 
situations over many dimensions. 
 
The paper is structured as follows: Section 1.1 presents some related literature; Section 2 introduces MIPM 
and a measure of conflict; Section 3 describes the experimental design; Section 4 presents the experimental 
result; and Section 5 concludes. 
 
1.1 Related literature 
 
The literature on negotiating practices spans several decades and methodologies. Important contributions have 
been summarized in a number of textbooks (see for instance, Bazerman & Neale, 1992; Fisher & Ury, 1981; 
Lewicki, Litterer, Minton, & Saunders, 1997; Murnighan, 1991; Raiffa, 1982; Thompson, 1998). However, to 
the best of our knowledge there are no comparisons to mechanisms that may improve the allocation between 
both parties. There is, however, some theoretical literature that studies software designed to support various 
negotiation activities, called negotiation support systems (see Bui, 1994; Holsapple and Whinston, 1996; 
Kilgour, 1996). One could interpret the mechanism we propose as one of such negotiation support systems. 
 
There is also a growing amount of literature from experimental economics and psychology that studies 
negotiating (or bargaining) practices. The majority of this experimental literature draws on the ultimatum 
game where one party decides his share of a prize but needs the approval of the recipient for the remainder of 
the prize (see seminal paper Guth et al, 1982; excellent surveys on the ultimatum game can be found in Roth, 
1995, or Camerer, 2003). Departing from this work, there is growing literature that looks at multidimensional 
situations and that, in particular, tests the mechanisms referred to in the introduction.  Hortala-Vallve and 
Llorente-Saguer (2010) test the MIPM proposed in Hortala-Vallve (2009); Daniel and Parco (2005) and 
Schneider and Kramer (2004) test the adjusted winner, proposed in Brams and Taylor (1996, 1999); Casella et 
al (2006, 2008) test storable votes, mechanism proposed in Casella (2004); and Engelmann and Grimm (2008) 
test the linking mechanism proposed in Jackson and Sonnenschein (2007). Except for the experiments on the 
adjusted winner – which lack a game-theoretical prediction - these latter papers conclude that although 
subjects depart from theoretical behavior, welfare levels are remarkably close to theoretical predictions. 
 
                                               
3
 Considering issues simultaneously is one of the keys of reaching integrative bargaining. See for instance Erickson 
et al (1974), Kelley (1966), Pruitt (1981) or Yukl et al (1976).   
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2 Multi-issue point mechanism and a measure of conflict  
 
This section consists of two parts. In the first part we describe our multi-issue point mechanism and 
in the second we introduce a measure of conflict of interest. 
 
2.1 The multi-issue Point Mechanism 
 
We follow the setup presented in Hortala-Vallve(2007) and Hortala-Vallve & Llorente-Saguer (2010). Two 
agents have opposing views over N (N≥2) issues that need to be approved or dismissed. Monetary transfers are 
not allowed. Each agent privately knows his preferences and the prior distribution from which they are drawn 
is common knowledge. 
 
Agents and issues are denoted i∈{1,2} and n∈{1,2,...N}, respectively. Agent i's valuation towards issue n is 
denoted niθ ∈ ℝ+. The preference vector of agent i is denoted ( )Niii θθθ ,...,1=  and his payoff on issue n is 
described as follows, 
 



n issuein    dimplemente is  willsopponent' his if 0
n issuein    dimplemente is  willhis if niθ
 
 
The total payoff is the sum of the individual payoffs across the N issues.  Implicit in our model is the 
assumption that valuations are independent across issues and no complementarities exist. While we need this 
assumption for our result to hold, we can consider any linear transformation of the payoffs. 
 
Without loss of generality we assume that agent i wishes the approval of all issues and agent j wishes their 
dismissal. Throughout we keep the interpretation that agents are deciding simultaneously over the approval or 
dismissal of various issues. However, our model could also be interpreted as a situation where two agents are 
auctioning N indivisible objects.  
 
We analyse two mechanisms. In the first, agents are endowed with P indivisible points that can be freely 
distributed between the issues. The number of points is fixed and independent of the number of issues. The 
action space is the collection of voting profiles:  
 
( ) { }{ }PppPpp NNN =++∈ ...:,...,1,0,..., 11 . 
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Hereafter we call this mechanism the multi-issue point mechanism (MIPM). An important feature of this 
mechanism is that it allows each agent to implement his will on issues where he invests more points than his 
opponent. Ties are broken with the toss of a fair coin. That is, 
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Our second mechanism is unrestricted negotiation. Agents can communicate (cheap talk) and need to reach a 
unanimous decision on whether a specific issue is approved, dismissed or tied. In this scenario, if an 
agreement is not reached in a predetermined amount of time, a status quo outcome (where all issues are tied) is 
implemented. 
 
In order to describe the behaviour of both mechanisms to different settings we need a way to measure the 
degree of conflict of our two player games. For this purpose, we adapt the measure of Conflict of Interest (CI) 
developed by Axelrod (1967). This index is highest when there are no gains of trade among subjects (i.e. when 
they both equally value all issues); instead, it is lowest when there are plenty of gains from trade and both 
subjects can reach their maximum utility. 
 
2.2 A measure of the Conflict of Interest 
 
Given a two-person game, we can construct the utility possibility frontier which is denoted G(x);  G(x) is the 
maximum utility player 2 can reach when player 1 gets x. This function is defined for x greater than the 
minimum possible payoff (pi ) and smaller than the highest possible payoff (pi ). However, the games our 
subjects play only have a finite set of outcomes, thus G(x) is not defined in all its range.  In order to simplify 
our analysis we convexify the set of outcomes so that the utility possibility frontier is now continuous. Note 
that convexifying the set of outcomes is analogous to allowing lotteries when subjects have von-Neumann 
Morgenstern utilities. 
 
A game that allows both players reach their maximum utility simultaneously should be viewed as a game of 
very little conflict; instead, a game where the gains for one player are losses to his opponent should be viewed 
as a game of high conflict. The former corresponds to a game of coordination and the latter to a constant sum 
game.  Our measure of conflict captures how close we are from a constant-sum game where no gains from 
trading issues are possible. This is calculated by computing the area between the maximum utility agent 1 can 
reach and the utility possibility frontier G(x).  Formally it reads as follows: 
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( ) ( )dxxGCI ∫ −−=
pi
pi
pi
pipi
)(2 2 , 
 
where the term before the integral is simply a normalisation so that our index is between 0 and 1. A higher CI 
indicates that there is a large amount of conflict and a lower CI indicates that there is low level of conflict 
among the two players. 
 
Below in Figure 1 we depict a situation where agent 1 has preferences (450,50,150) and agent 2 has 
preferences (50,250,300) –note that 600=pi  and .0=pi  The stars show the pair of utilities associated to 
each outcome. For instance, the outcome where agent 1 decides on the first issue and agent 2 decides on the 
second and third issues is depicted as the utility pair (400,550). The shaded area (in yellow) is, once 
normalised, the CI of this particular game. In red, we see the utility possibility frontier of a pure coordination 
game where both agents can achieve the maximum utility thus the conflict is minimum (CI = 0); in blue we 
can see the utility possibility frontier of a constant sum game where conflict is maximum (CI = 1). 
 
Figure 1: Utility pairs associated to all possible outcomes when two agents have preferences (400, 
50,150) and (50,250,300); G(x) denotes the possibility frontier of the convexified set of outcomes. 
 
Figure 1 shows that CI captures how far the set of utility pairs are from the blue line where the sum of the 
subjects’ payoffs is constant. However CI fails to capture equitability in the achieved outcomes. Compare for 
instance a situation where both subjects have preferences (301,299) with a situation where both subjects have 
preferences (599,1). Both situations have the same index (CI=1) however, the conflict among subjects differs. 
In the first case any subject is almost indifferent between winning any of the two issues (and losing the 
remaining one). Instead, in the second case both subjects have a strong preference to win the first issue. This 
simple example highlights the fact that Axelrod’s index of conflict captures the possibilities of trade in a 2-
player game but remains silent about the inequality among players. 
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3 Experimental design 
 
We run a total of 19 sessions with 16 to 20 subjects in each session. In total 356 subjects participate. Students 
are recruited through the online recruitment system ORSEE (Greiner, 2004) and the experiment takes place on 
networked personal computers in the LEEX at Universitat Pompeu Fabra between April 2006 and October 
2009. The experiment is programmed and conducted with the software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). The data 
and programme code for the experiment are available upon request. 
 
The same procedure is used in all sessions. Instructions (see Appendix) are read aloud and questions answered 
in private. Students are asked to answer a questionnaire to check their full understanding of the experimental 
design (if any of their answers are wrong the experimenter refers privately to the section of the instructions 
where the correct answer is provided). Students are isolated and can only communicate through the computer 
terminals in the negotiation treatments (this communication is free through chat boxes but students cannot 
identify themselves). At each period subjects are randomly matched into groups of two.4  The table below 
summarises all our sessions. 
 
Mechanism Issues No of 
votes Sessions 
# Independent 
Groups Subjects Periods 
Time 
Constraint 
SM 2 6 3 9 18 50 (25)* - 
SM 3 6 3 9 18 50 (18)* - 
SM 6 6 3 9 18 50 (10)* - 
Neg 2 6 2 3 20 (16)† 25 3 minutes 
Neg 3 6 4 5 20 18 4 minutes 
Neg 6 6 4 5 20 (18)† 10 8 minutes 
 
Table 1: Details of all our experimental sessions 
† in two of our sessions not all recruited subjects showed up 
* we restrict our analysis to sessions of equal length (per number of issues) 
 
Preferences are induced by assigning a valuation in terms of euro cents to each of the issues. Valuations are 
drawn from a uniform distribution of vectors with elements being positive multiples of 50; no issue is valued 
zero, and the valuations in each vector sum to 600.5 The purpose of the constant total valuation is twofold. 
Firstly, it ensures comparability across games and avoids framing effects.6 Secondly, with normalised 
preferences all subjects are weighed equally when we calculate our efficient utilitarian outcome. When 
computing the Conflict of Interest in each of our matched pairs we assume 600=pi  and .0=pi  
                                               
4
 We partition the subjects into three sets of six players (or two set of ten players) so as to obtain three (two) independent 
observations. We have analysed each observation separately and we see no remarkable difference between them.  
5
 For example (300,300), (100,500), (500,100) or (550,50) are all equally likely. 
6
 Framing effects imply that voters may behave differently when they are assigned payments (1,2) or (200,400). We 
want to abstract from such framing issues which have been broadly analysed in many different settings -see the 
seminal reference Kahneman and Tversky (1983). 
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Each issue can be tied or ‘won’ by either of the matched subjects. In our experimental sessions we avoid any 
reference to the issue being approved or dismissed because we want both matched subjects to be in a 
symmetrical situation and we fear that labelling the outcome of each issue in terms of approval or dismissal 
may have an effect. At this point it is worth mentioning that various studies show that negotiations usually 
reach a more efficient allocation when subjects bargain over abstract situations (see for example Hyder et al, 
2000). In future research it will be interesting to analyse the relative performance of MIPM and unconstrained 
negotiation in specific bargaining situations (e.g. divorce settlements, ethical issues, industrial disputes, 
legislative committees, etc.); however, at the moment this is out of the scope of our paper. 
 
Whenever a subject wins on an issue, he earns his valuation on that issue and his opponent earns nothing; 
whenever ties occur on an issue, subjects earn half their valuation (note that we are not deciding on that issue 
with the toss of a fair coin; instead we assign the expected value of such randomisation). The total payoff in a 
period is the sum of the individual payoffs across the N issues. 
 
In each treatment the same number of issues is presented.  In each period, subjects are told their own 
valuations over the issues, but the valuations of the opponent are never known. In the MIPM sessions, subjects 
are asked to distribute 6 votes among the issues. In the negotiation sessions, they can freely negotiate through 
a chat box. This communication is unrestricted with the exception that subjects cannot reveal their identity (in 
the instructions we state that doing so implies this person being excluded from the lab’s recruiting list; in the 
posterior analysis of the dialogues we do not find anyone breaking this rule).  Parallel to their communication, 
subjects can send binding proposals at any time to the subject they are matched with. These proposals specify 
the outcome in each of the N issues they are bargaining for.  Once an agent accepts his opponent’s proposal, 
the period ends. If no proposal is accepted within the time specified in Table 1, all issues are drawn.7 
 
After all subjects have cast their votes or all subjects have reached an agreement (this agreement may be the 
status quo reached at the end of the negotiating time), the program computes the payoff of each subject and 
displays: (i) his valuations; (ii) the outcomes; and (iii) his payoff for that period. When subjects used MIPM, 
the following information was also provided: (iv) their vote; and (v) their opponent’s vote. The final payment 
of the session is computed by adding the payoff obtained in three (randomly selected) periods and a show up 
fee of 3 euros; in the case of negotiation with 6 issues we selected four periods instead of three. At the end of 
each session participants are asked to fill in a questionnaire on the computer and are given their final payment 
                                               
7
 Carnevale and Lawler (1987) claim that most negotiations occur under some form of time pressure. Besides it is not 
feasible to run a laboratory experiment without such constraints as the possibility of gridlock may freeze the whole 
experiment indefinitely. Yukl et al (1976) and Carnevale and Lawlwer(1986) show that early deadlines can affect 
negatively the payoff of integrative negotiations. We try avoiding such effect by running a pilot experiment and 
implementing a time constraint above the maximum time subjects declared optimal. 
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in private. Session length, including waiting time and payment, is around an hour and a half. The average 
payment is 14.97 €. 
 
In table 1 above we see that the sessions with MIPM consist of many more periods than the negotiation 
sessions. The number of periods was determined so that each session approximately took an hour and a half. 
When parties negotiated, they took much longer to reach a decision so we reduced the number of periods. In 
the present paper we only look at the initial periods of MIPM sessions so that we can compare the use of 
different mechanisms while keeping constant the experience of our subjects (i.e. we only look at the first 25, 
18 and 10 periods in the 2, 3 and 6 issues sessions, respectively).8 
 
It is often mentioned that adding more dimensions to a negotiation should ease the reach of an agreement (see 
Thomson, 2001). The reason behind this idea is fairly intuitive: enabling more dimensions allows more trade-
offs thus there are more gains from trade (i.e. there are more outcomes that Pareto dominate the status quo). 
Our conflict of interest precisely captures this idea. We have computed the index in all the situations we 
generated in the lab and see that the average CI decreases with the number of issues (i.e. the more issues the 
less conflict or the more gains of trade).9 
 
4 Experimental Results  
4.1 Aggregated results  
 
Allowing negotiating parties settle their dispute is a difficult task. Inefficiencies arise because parties do not 
extract possible gains from their different attitudes to risk, patience or relative intensities across different 
policy dimensions. Strict Pareto improvements fail to realise due to the strategic use of the private information 
each party has about his own preferences. In this paper, we focus on the role of differing relative intensities 
among the various decisions that need to be taken. 
 
We want to see how MIPM compares to the way parties usually resolve their disputes, by unconstrained 
negotiation. We first look at the average payoff obtained by our subjects. Given that monetary transfers are not 
possible, average payoff might seem meaningless. However, because preferences are normalised, our 
efficiency requirement can be interpreted as the measure agents would use at a constitutional stage. It 
corresponds to an ex-ante evaluation where all possibilities are equally weighed when preferences are not yet 
known.  
 
                                               
8
 An extensive analysis of the MIPM sessions can be found in Hortala-Vallve and Llorente-Saguer (2009). 
9
 In the appendix (section A1) we report the summary statistics and depict the frequency and cumulative distribution 
of CI in the induced games. 
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We also compare both mechanisms in terms of the percentage of times they achieve a Pareto optimal 
allocation. We are interested in reporting both measures because by only reporting one measure we lose 
important information. On the one hand we want to know whether subjects could jointly benefit by reaching a 
different outcome (Pareto optimality), and on the other hand, we want to know how far subjects are from the 
outcome that would maximise their joint utility. Note that there could be scope for improvement for both 
subjects but their joint payoff could be marginally close to the one that maximises their joint utility; or 
alternatively, there could be a situation where they could not jointly improve, but their joint payoff could be 
much smaller than the efficient one. 
 
The status quo under free negotiation is the one where each issue is decided with the toss of a fair coin. In 
Figure 1, the outcome lies on the blue line and precisely any outcome below this line yields an average utility 
strictly smaller than 300.  This outcome can also be interpreted as the point where trade-offs across issues are 
not exploited. Hereafter we generally refer to this outcome as the no-trade outcome. When subjects using 
MIPM uniformly randomise across all voting profiles they also achieve a payoff of 300 thus replicate the 
payoff achieved by the no-trade outcome. 
 
   Issues 
  
 2 3 6 
Mean realized payoff  378 (96%) 376 (93%) 375 (96%) 
Standard deviation of realized payoff  99 76 52 
Mean of max possible payoff  395 403 391 
Status quo payoff  300 (76%) 300 (74%) 300 (77%) 
% Pareto efficient outcomes  96 77 60 
Negotiation 
% no-trade outcomes  42 20 7 
Mean realized payoff  373 (96%) 387 (95%) 383 (97%) 
Standard deviation of realized payoff  110 107 62 
Mean of max possible payoff  388 406 394 
Randomisation payoff  300 (77%) 300 (74%) 300 (76%) 
% Pareto efficient outcomes  93 84 62 
MIPM 
% no-trade outcomes  26 4 0 
 
Table 2: Mean payoff, payoff standard deviation percentage of Pareto efficient outcomes, and percentage of 
no-trade outcomes achieved by negotiation and MIPM (in brackets, payoff as a percentage of the maximum 
possible welfare).  Variables in grey denote theoretical computations; variables in black denote experimental 
results.  
 
 
MIPM does at least as good as negotiation: subjects that use this mechanism reach similar payoff levels to the 
subjects that freely negotiate. We also report the mean of the maximum payoff that each pair could achieve 
(see numbers in brackets of actual payoffs as a percentage of the maximum payoff).  MIPM does significantly 
better when subjects negotiate over three or six issues; the test statistics of a Wilcoxon–Mann–Whitney two-
 12 
sample rank-sum test are 0.0278 and 0.0529 respectively. Against MIPM we can say that it yields higher 
variance on the individual payoffs: in the three cases, the variance on the subjects’ realised payoffs is higher 
when subjects used the MIPM than when subjects freely negotiated. This is because when subjects freely 
negotiate, they know the details of the proposal they are accepting; instead, when subjects use the MIPM they 
only know their own actions and preferences and (implicitly) accept the allocation that results from comparing 
his/her distribution of votes to his/her opponents’ one. In the latter case there is more uncertainty and this is 
reflected in the variance of the final payoff. 
 
In Table 2 we also show that our results are robust to considering the alternative efficiency criterion of Pareto 
efficiency. Once again, our mechanism performs similarly to negotiation. The percentage of Pareto optimal 
allocations always decreases with the number of issues. This follows from the fact that having more issues 
implies a larger set of outcomes and thus a higher likelihood of Pareto improvements. 
 
In terms of efficiency MIPM does at least as good as unconstrained negotiation. Additionally we want to 
measure the cost involved in settling disputes. In our situation this is analogous to analysing the time each pair 
of subjects need to reach an agreement.  Results are summarised in Table 3 below. It shows that MIPM clearly 
dominates unconstrained negotiation in terms of time. This is in fact an immediate consequence of the design 
of both mechanisms: MIPM only entails subjects unilaterally deciding the distribution of their votes and 
avoiding communication. We can see that for any number of issues MIPM used a tenth of the time that is used 
in unconstrained negotiation. Besides, we can see that average times increase with the number of issues –this 
is a consequence of the increased complexity of dealing with more issues.10 
 
 
  
 Issues 
 
  
 2 3 6 
 Average  86 162 286 
Negotiation 
 St. Dev.  62 74 144 
 Average  9 16 29 
MIPM 
 St. Dev.  10 10 20 
 
Table 3: Average time and standard deviation needed to reach an agreement (in 
seconds). Recall that free negotiation sessions had a time constraint of 180, 240, 480 
seconds in the 2, 3 and 6 issues cases, respectively. 
 
4.2 The relevance of the Conflict of Interest  
 
The results in the previous section are supportive of MIPM: it reaches similar levels of welfare than 
unconstrained negotiation and it does so more swiftly. We now want to understand the source of our results 
                                               
10
 In the appendix (A3) we report the distribution of negotiation times. 
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and analyse the performance of each mechanism in different situations: it could be the case that there is a 
particular subset of observations where one mechanism clearly outperforms the other one, but these 
differences could cancel out when we take the average. To do so, we use the index CI introduced above in 
order to classify the different games our subjects play according to the inherent degree of conflict; recall that a 
game has larger conflict when there are less possibilities of trade and subjects find it difficult to reach an 
agreement that pleases them both. For instance, a situation where subjects have preferences (50,100,450) and 
(400,50,150) is diametrically different to a situation where subjects have preferences (450,100,50) and 
(400,150,50). In the first case, the most preferred decision of each subject does not coincide thus there are 
gains from trade and the conflict can be resolved easily. Instead, in the second case, both agents equally rank 
the issues and there is no Pareto improvement with respect to the status quo or no-trade outcome where all 
issues are tied and both agents received a payoff of 300. 
 
Before we analyse in detail our data in terms of the level of conflict it is worth pointing out that the analysis 
below refers mainly to the free-negotiation sessions. In the MIPM sessions subjects do not realise the level of 
conflict inherent in their situation because they cannot communicate, and the level of conflict can only be 
derived by knowing the combination of both opposing parties’ preferences.  
 
4.2.1 Conflict of Interest and Payoff 
 
We first analyse the relationship between CI and the realised payoff. We expect this correlation to be fairly 
high as the CI precisely determines the upper bound of what is achievable: in a low conflict game high joint 
payoffs are possible, instead in a high conflict game the sum of both players’ payoffs cannot be much higher 
than 600. We report the correlation of CI with individual payoffs and the group payoffs, i.e. the sum of utilities 
of the two opposing parties.11 
 
  Issues 
  2 3 6 
Ind -0.79 -0.62 -0.57 
Negotiation 
Group -0.97 -0.78 -0.79 
Ind -0.67 -0.53 -0.49 
MIPM 
Group -0.94 -0.88 -0.86 
 
Table 4: Correlation between the Conflict of Interest (CI) and the individual 
and group  realisedrealized payoffs. and the group-average realised payoffs.  
 
                                               
11
 Assuming independence of observations, all these correlations are significant at 1% significance level. 
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We find a correlation close to minus one between CI and the group payoff. The correlation with individual 
payoffs can only be smaller because the group payoffs cancel the variation within each matched pair. Recall 
that individual payoffs display a higher variance with MIPM than with negotiation −this is why we obtain 
lower correlation with individual payoffs in MIPM than with negotiation. 
 
The case with two issues is especially stark: the conflict of interest and the group payoff are almost perfectly 
(negative) correlated. This can be explained by the dichotomous nature of the two issues case: opposing 
parties can equally rank both issues and both prefer to be decisive on the same issue; or opposing parties can 
rank issues differently and prefer to be decisive on different issues. Note that the first case is close to a 
constant-sum game and the second, to a coordination game where gains from trade are possible (and easy to 
realise) 
 
Below we illustrate the previous results. We partition observations in four classes of conflict corresponding to 
each 25th percentile and classify them as situations with very low conflict (VLC), with low conflict (LC), with 
high conflict (HC), and with very high conflict (VHC).12 We observe that the payoff reached by both 
mechanisms decreases with the level of conflict. 
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Figure 2: Average payoff at different levels of conflict with 90%-confidence intervals. 
 
Figure 2 shows that the aggregate results presented in Section 3.1 did not hide varying relative 
performances of the two mechanisms we study: for every level of conflict free negotiation and the 
MIPM achieve very similar levels of welfare. 
 
4.2.2 Conflict of Interest and Time 
 
                                               
12
 We partition our data so that we have classes with the same number of observations (each class has a fourth of 
observations). The quartiles with 2 issues are 0.5, 0.75, and 0.92; with 3 issues 0.48, 0.62, and 0.74; and, with 6 
issues 0.53, 0.60, and 0.68. Our results are robust to considering different partitions (see Appendix A2). 
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In Section 3 above we have seen that subjects resolving their disputes through unconstrained negotiation take 
much longer at reaching an agreement. Precisely, the risk of parties never reaching a decision (this is usually 
referred to as gridlock in the political science literature) lead us to introduce a time limit in our negotiation 
sessions. Subjects had to reach an agreement within 3, 4 and 8 minutes in the 2, 3 and 6 issues sessions, 
respectively. Failure to do so implied the implementation of the status quo outcome where both no trade 
occurs and subjects obtain a payoff of 300 each. 
 
The next table captures the relation between the time subjects needed to reach an agreement and the level of 
conflict, CI. We observe that there is a positive correlation between the time subjects needed to reach an 
agreement and the level of conflict when subjects freely negotiated. In other words, when the conflict is high a 
swift agreement is less likely. Instead, when subjects use MIPM they cannot communicate and do not realise 
the inherent level of conflict, therefore the time spent thinking about the distribution of their votes is 
unaffected by CI.13 
 
 
 
  Issues 
  2 3 6 
Negotiation  0.44 0.37 0.30 
MIPM I 0.01 0.01 -0.03 
 
Table 5: Correlation between the Conflict of Interest (CI) 
and the time subjects needed to reach an agreement.  
 
Figure 2 below illustrates the table above using four classes of conflict corresponding to each 25th percentile 
for each number of issues separately. We see that the time parties spend negotiating increases with the conflict 
of interest. When CI is low there are plenty of gains from trade and agents reach decisions fast. Instead, when 
CI is high any negotiating party may try to reach an agreement that only benefits himself, tensions among 
parties may escalate and only with time parties realize that there is no outcome that is Pareto superior to the 
status quo outcome. Results in Figure 2 are robust to only considering negotiation situations that reach an 
agreement before the deadline.14 
 
                                               
13
 Assuming independence of observations, these correlations are significant at 1% significance level in the case of 
negotiation and not significant in the case of MIPM. 
14
 Average time only decreases a 7.1% when we consider situations where status quo is not reached. 
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Figure 3: Average time at different levels of conflict with 90%-confidence intervals. We also 
show the time constraints of 3, 4 and 8 minutes, for the cases with 2, 3, and 6 issues, respectively. 
 
4.2.3 Conflict of Interest and no-trade outcome 
 
The fact that our negotiation sessions had a status quo outcome implies that subjects that are not reaching an 
agreement may decide to implement the status quo outcome without the need of exhausting all available time. 
Strategic agents may improve the efficiency of the process by implementing the status quo outcome swiftly 
when they realise that no other outcome may be agreed. When subjects used the MIPM they never reached the 
no-trade outcome in the six issues case and only a 4% of the observations in the three issues case. Instead, in 
the two issues case they reached it a 26% of the time (and in 96.6% of these cases both subjects equally ranked 
the issues). 
 
Table 4 below reports the percentage of cases where the no trade outcome is reached when subjects freely 
negotiated (we also report the cases where parties reach the status quo by exhausting the negotiating time). 
Along the lines of the above observations, the number of status quo outcomes increases with the level of 
conflict.  Besides, we can see that while keeping the level of conflict fixed, the number of status quo outcomes 
decreases with the number of issues (with the exception of the very low conflict levels). This is a consequence 
of the fact that an increase in the number of issues expands the set of outcomes, thus it becomes more likely 
that subjects agree on an outcome different than the status quo.  
 
 
  Conflict of interest 
  VLow Low High VHigh 
2 issues  0 (0) 11 (5) 72 (21) 95 (34) 
3 issues  8(6) 9 (8) 20 (19) 45 (37) 
6 issues  1(0) 3 (3) 11(10) 13 (13) 
 
Table 6: Percentage of times parties reach the status quo outcome in 
free negotiation; in brackets we report the percentage of times parties 
reach the status quo outcome by exhausting the negotiating time. 
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The analysis from the previous table needs to be complemented by the welfare consequences of reaching the 
status quo outcome. It could well be the case that subjects reach the status quo and that this outcome is Pareto 
optimal (e.g. opposing subjects have preferences (350,250) and (550,50)); or that the outcome that maximises 
the sum of utilities yields a similar payoff to the status quo (e.g. when opposing subjects have preferences 
(250,200,150) and (200,150,200) the average of the maximum possible payoff is 325 –only 25 units above the 
status quo payoff). Tables 7 and 8 report on this.  
 
 
  Conflict of interest 
  VLow Low High VHigh 
2 issues  . 68 92 96 
3 issues  0 0 0 25 
6 issues  0 0 0 0 
 
Table 7: Percentage of times of  Pareto efficient outcomes 
when parties reach the status quo outcome in free negotiation. 
 
We can see that the likelihood that the status quo is efficient (when subjects reach such outcome) increases 
with the level of conflict, specially with 2 issues. With six issues the no-trade outcome can hardly ever be 
Pareto efficient and it is indeed the case that whenever our subjects reached that outcome there were 
possibilities of trade. 
 
  Conflict of interest 
  VLow Low High VHigh 
2 issues  . 392 (77%) 347 (86%) 319 (94%) 
3 issues  476 (63%) 416 (72%) 380 (79%) 338 (89%) 
6 issues  425 (71%) 400 (75%) 376 (80%) 346 (87%) 
 
Table 8: Mean maximum possible payoff in the situations where 
parties reach the status quo outcome in free negotiation; in parenthesis 
the payoff subjects achieved by implementing the status quo (300) as a 
percentage of the maximum payoff. 
 
Similar to the results on Pareto efficiency, we realise that the utilitarian costs of reaching the status quo 
decrease with the level of conflict. In table 5 above we saw that the likelihood of reaching the status quo 
increases with the level of conflict; however, table 8 shows that the costs in terms of payoff diminish as these 
events become more likely (i.e. as we increase the level of conflict). Comparing the results in table 8 with the 
initial average results in table 2, we can see that reaching the status quo always yields an average payoff (as a 
percentage of the maximum payoff) smaller than the overall average payoff (as a percentage of the maximum 
payoff). In other words, reaching the status quo payoff has its costs. 
 18 
 
Finally, it is worth noting that we do not observe strong deadline effects where subjects use the time deadline 
strategically to forge better agreements.15 Agreements are not concentrated at the end of the negotiating period 
and happen throughout. Moreover, the time when the agreement is reached does not affect the average payoff 
reached by our subjects. 
 
4.2.4 Can CI explain the differences between both mechanisms? 
 
In summary, we have seen that regardless the number of issues, an increase in conflict has three consequences 
for parties that freely negotiate: (1) decreases overall payoff, (2) increases the time needed to reach an 
agreement, and (3) increases the likelihood of gridlock (not reaching a decision and the status quo outcome 
being implemented). When conflicting parties use MIPM only the first aspect applies. 
 
The main source of inefficiency when parties negotiate through unconstrained negotiation comes from 
situations where there is high conflict and parties are not able to Pareto improve with respect to the status quo 
allocation (when such Pareto improvements exist). The fact that under those circumstances negotiations end at 
a gridlock explains why a simple mechanism like the one proposed in this paper can marginally improve upon 
unconstrained negotiation.   
 
We test this intuition formally. We regress the payoff as a lineal function of the period, a dummy that is equal 
to one when the mechanism used is negotiation and 0 when they used MIPM (DummyNeg), the conflict of 
interest and a constant. We want to see whether the differences in payoff reached by each mechanism are 
statistically significant; we also want to see their temporal evolution. In our estimation we use a Random-
effects GLS regression, clustered by independent groups. Table 6 summarises our results. 
 
      
excluding negotiating outcomes 
where parties reached the 
status quo outcome 
  2 issues 3 issues 6 issues  2 issues 3 issues 6 issues 
DummyNeg  -2.56 -8.34*** -4.6**  5.71*** 2.54 -0.69 
Period  -0.05 0.4 1.32***  -0.06 0.67*** 1.32*** 
Conflict of 
Interest  -307.24
***
 -262.46*** -259.73***  -300.75*** -265.85*** -251.64*** 
Constant  600.33*** 549.49*** 533.54***  595.76*** 549*** 528.63*** 
Obs.  2248 2406 1320  1870 2110 1264 
 
Table 6: Random effects GLS regression of the payoff as a function of the listed variables. 
Hubbard-White robust standard errors, clustered by independent groups.  
***
, 
**
, and *, denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
                                               
15
 For an excellent analysis of deadline effects see Roth, Murnighan, and Schoumaker (1988). 
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The results from Table 6 show that CI is always highly significant and its coefficient is the most relevant: the 
index is the most determinant element of the payoff reached by our subjects. The comparison between free 
negotiation and the MIPM is captured by the negative sign of the DummyNeg variable in the first three 
columns: when subjects negotiate they obtain a lower payoff than when they use the MIPM (the coefficient of 
this variable is only significant at conventional levels for three and six issues).  
 
The last three columns show that the coefficient on the free negotiation dummy changes its sign when we drop 
the observations that reach the status quo outcome under unconstrained negotiation. In other words, when we 
drop the observations where no trade occurs, we can no longer say that unconstrained negotiation performs 
worst. The coefficient fails to be significant in the three and six issues cases but is significant in the two issues 
case. With two issues, the positive coefficient (and significantly different than zero) indicates the advantages 
of communicating when there is low conflict: it allows agents to trade-off their interests but also allows them 
to avoid Pareto dominated situations when those are easy to identify. In the two issue case, dropping the 
observations where the status quo is implemented is analogous to dropping those observations where there are 
no gains from trade (when both subjects equally rank the issues). It follows that the remaining situations have 
gains from trade and these can be easily identified when subjects communicate. Instead, when implementing a 
mechanism that avoids communication like MIPM, subjects may not be able to avoid Pareto dominated 
outcomes. 
 
Overall, we need to take these regressions with caution. On the one hand, we already saw in Section 4.1 that 
payoff differences when using both mechanisms are only marginally different. On the other hand, in the 3 and 
6 issues case, the change in sign in the coefficient of DummyNeg occurs when we drop very few observations 
(4% in the 6 issues case and a 13% in the 3 issues case) 
 
MIPM avoids the efficiency costs of implementing the status quo when there are high levels of conflict and 
performs similarly to unconstrained negotiation when low levels of conflict are present. The main limitation 
lies in the situations where gains from trade can be clearly identified (e.g. 2 issues with opposite ranking of the 
issues) when free communication avoids the reach of Pareto dominated situations.  
 
5 Conclusion 
 
We have analysed the performance of two alternative mechanisms to resolve disputes in a controlled 
laboratory experiment. We have seen that MIPM, so far not analysed in the negotiation literature, does overall 
at least as good as unconstrained negotiation, but allows the reach of an agreement more rapidly (precisely 
because it avoids communication among conflicting parties). The essence of MIPM is that it allows parties to 
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unilaterally trade-off their interests across dimensions and strengthens their position on those issues they 
mostly care about.   
 
There remain many open questions. Of particular interest is to know when different mechanisms should be 
used. Following our results it seems sensible to assume that alternatives to the usual ways parties negotiate 
(unconstrained negotiation) are not necessary when the levels of conflict are low.  Instead, it is when conflict 
is high that we need alternative mechanisms that avoid escalating tension among negotiating parties and 
eventually gridlock. It is precisely in these environments that our mechanism outperforms unconstrained 
negotiation in terms of payoff and in terms of the time needed to reach an agreement. Still, the answer is not so 
simple because it does not seem feasible to propose different mechanisms depending on the conflict of 
interest. Having different mechanisms for different situations may introduce a new conflict: “which 
mechanism should we use in our particular situation?” In order to avoid this extra level of conflict we may 
sometimes need to propose a unique negotiating protocol. In this setting we have shown that MIPM dominates 
unconstrained negotiation.  
 
Finally, we have restricted our attention to unconstrained negotiation through computer terminals in order to 
avoid the unquantifiable effects of face-to-face interaction. How our results extend to such situations remains 
an open question. While there is consensus in the literature that negotiation through chat might take more time 
than face-to-face negotiation (see for instance Purdy et al, 2000) there is no consensus about whether 
negotiation through chat obtains better or worse outcomes than face-to-face negotiation. Previous authors have 
shown that written communication (as compared to oral communication) may ease the reach of an agreement 
(see Croson, 1999). On this line, Carnevale et al (1981 and 1986) show that denying visual access to the 
negotiation partners achieves more integrative results. Instead, Purdy and Balakrishnan (2000) compare 
negotiated outcome when communication happens face-to-face, through videoconference, through telephone 
or through computer terminals and find that the latter leads to longer processes and less integrative behaviour. 
 
In the future we plan to code the dialogues that occurred between our subjects and understand whether it is the 
individual characteristics or simply the interaction of different negotiating protocols that explain the outcomes 
and time invested in reaching an agreement in unconstrained negotiation. We also plan to test how a 
combination of MIPM and unconstrained negotiation may improve the final results; inspired by the results in 
this paper we believe that a mechanism that would allow subjects to freely negotiation using as a status quo 
outcome of MIPM may exploit the virtues of both mechanism. Specifically, the combination of both 
mechanisms may extract gains from trade swiftly and may avoid Pareto dominated outcomes. 
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Appendix 
 
A1  Distribution of Conflict of Interest (CI) in our experimental sessions 
 
 Issues 
 2 3 6 
Mean 0.697 0.610 0.608 
St Dev 0.226 0.184 0.187 
Min 0.167 0.187 0.347 
Max 1 1 1 
 
Table A1: Summary statistics of CI in our experimental sessions by number of issues. 
We can see that the mean and the dispersion decrease with the number of issues. 
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Figure A1: Frequency map of the Conflict of Interest in our experimental sessions by 
number of issues. We can see how the index concentrates in the middle (decrease in 
dispersion).  
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Figure A2: Distribution function of the Conflict of 
Interest in our experimental sessions by number of issues.  
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A2  An alternative CI classification 
 
We define three categories as follows: low conflict is when CI is smaller or equal than 0.5, high conflict is 
when CI is greater than 0.7 and medium conflict are the cases in between. As opposed to the classification we 
assumed in the main text, we now consider the same threshold  for any number of issues so we first need to 
report on the percentage of observations for each category (table A2). We later graphically show that all 
results in the text remain unchanged (figures A3 and A4). Finally we also report the analogous table to table 6 
with the percentage of times parties reach the status quo (table A3). 
 
  Alternative Conflict of Interest 
  Low Medium High 
2 issues  26% 20% 54% 
3 issues  31% 33% 36% 
6 issues  20% 60% 20% 
 
Table A2: Percentage of observations that fit in 
each category of conflict by number of issues. 
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Figure A3: Average payoff at different levels of conflict (alternative measure) with 90%-confidence intervals. 
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Figure A4: Average time at different levels of conflict (alternative measure) with 90%-confidence 
intervals. We also show the time constraints of 3, 4 and 8 minutes, for the cases with 2, 3, and 6 issues, 
respectively. 
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  Alternative Conflict of interest 
  Low Medium High 
2 issues  0 (0) 14 (4) 54 (9) 
3 issues  4 (3) 9 (7) 28 (20) 
6 issues  1 (0) 4 (4) 9 (9) 
 
Table A3: Percentage of times parties reach the status quo 
outcome in free negotiation; in parenthesis the percentage of times 
parties reached the status quo outcome by exhausting the 
negotiating time. 
 
 
 
 
A3  Time needed to reach an agreement with negotiation  
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Figure A5: Frequency map of the time needed to reach an agreement when subjects freely negotiated over 2 issues. 
Above we can see the observations when  the outcome is different than the status quo outcome (we call it TO for 
trade outcome) for different levels of conflict: we can see that for lower levels of conflict there is a deadline effect and 
players (after having tried to reach a more beneficial agreement) realise that there are gains from trade and those need 
to be agreed upon before the deadline. Below we can see the observations when the outcome coincides with the status 
quo outcome (we call it NTO for no-trade outcome) for different levels of conflict: when there is high conflict we see 
a big spike, this corresponds to the situations where no agreement was achieved and the status quo was implemented. 
We can also see that when there is loads of conflict and the no-trade outcome is agreed, there is loads of variance in 
terms of when is the agreement is reached. 
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Figure A6: Frequency map of the time needed to reach an agreement when subjects freely negotiated over 3 
issues. Above we can see the observations when  the outcome is different than the status quo outcome (we call it 
TO for trade outcome) for different levels of conflict: we can see that for higher levels of conflict there is a 
deadline effect and players (after having tried to reach a more beneficial agreement) realise that there are gains 
from trade and those need to be agreed upon before the deadline. Below we can see the observations when the 
outcome coincides with the status quo outcome (we call it NTO for no-trade outcome) for different levels of 
conflict: most realizations now coincide with subjects reaching the deadline. 
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Figure A7: Frequency map of the time needed to reach an agreement when subjects freely 
negotiated over 6 issues. This case is analogous to the one above (Figure A6, 3 issues). 
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Figure A8: Average payoff at different levels of conflict in terms of the time subjects needed to reach an 
agreement. We can see that the time when an agreement was reached does not affect the average payoff in 
any of the cases (2, 3 or 6 issues –i.e. first, second or third row, respectively). 
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INSTRUCTIONS (Translated from the original Spanish instructions) 
 
We are grateful for your participation and for your contribution to an Economics Department project. 
The sum of money you will earn during the session will be given privately to you at the end of the 
experiment. From now on (and until the end of the experiment) you cannot talk to any other 
participant. If you have a question, please raise your hand and one of the instructors will answer your 
questions privately. Please do not ask anything aloud! 
 
These experiments consist of 50 periods. The rules are the same for all participants and for all 
periods. At the beginning of each period you will be randomly assigned to another participant with 
whom you will interact. None of you will know who the other participant is. 
 
You and the other participant will simultaneously vote over a group of three questions. Each question 
has three possible results: 1) you win and he loses it; 2) you lose and he wins it; and, finally 3) ties 
occur. These results will determine the profits that yourself and the other participant will have in each 
period. Remember that the participant with whom you are interacting in each period is selected 
randomly in each period. 
 
 
1. Information at the beginning of each period 
 
At the beginning of each period you will be told your ‘valuations’ for each issue. You will only know your 
own valuations.  The valuation of each issue specifies how much you earn when you win that issue. These 
valuations are expressed in terms of Eurocents. 
 
The possible valuations are summarised in the following table. You should consider all possible permutations. 
That is, looking at the first row, it is for instance possible that the valuations for issues 1, 2 and 3 are 50, 500 
and 50 respectively (instead of 500, 50 and 50). As you can see, the valuations are multiples of 50 and add up 
to 600. 
 
 
Issue 1 Issue 2 Issue 3 
500 50 50 
450 100 50 
400 150 50 
400 100 100 
350 200 50 
350 150 100 
300 250 50 
300 200 100 
300 150 150 
250 250 100 
250 200 150 
200 200 200 
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The valuations of each participant have been selected randomly by the computer. All possible combinations of 
valuations are equally likely. The valuations of each participant need not be equal; what is more, they will 
usually be different. 
 
2. Voting procedure 
 
In each period you will have six votes that you will have to distribute among the different issues. After doing 
so you should press the ‘OK’ key. The participant with whom you are matched at each period has the same 
number of votes. 
 
 
 
3. Voting result 
 
The result on each voting procedure will be resolved by the following rule: if the number of votes you have 
assigned to an issue is 
• … higher than the number of votes of the other participant, you win the issue 
• … smaller than the number of votes of the other participant, you lose the issue 
• … equal to the number of votes of the other participant, ties occur 
 
For instance, if you vote in the following way: 
 
 Issue 1 Issue 2 Issue 3 
Your votes 3 1 2 
His votes 0 4 2 
 
You win Issue 1 given that you have assigned more votes (3) than him (0) in that issue; you lose issue 2 given 
that you have invested less votes (1) than him (4); and you tie issue 3 given that you have both invested the 
same number of votes (2). 
 
 
 
4. Profits in each period 
 
In each period your profits will be equal to the sum of the valuations of all issue you win plus half the 
valuation of the issue you tie. For instance, if in the previous example your valuations are 350, 100 and 150, 
according to the assignation of votes in Section 3 your benefits will be: 350 in issue 1, 0 in issue 2 and 75 (half 
of 150) in issue 3. As you do not know the valuations of the other participants you will  not know his /her 
profits. 
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5. Information at the end of each period 
 
At the end of each period, as you can see in the previous screenshot, you will receive the following 
information: 
 
• Your valuations in each issue 
• Your votes in each issue 
• The votes of the participant you have interacted with 
• The issues you win, lose and tie 
• Your profits 
 
6. Final payment 
 
At the end of the last period, the computer will randomly select 3 periods and you will earn the sum of the 
profits on those periods. Additionally you will be paid three euros for having taken part in the experiment. 
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7. Questionnaire 
 
 
1. Circle the correct answer. When you have to vote…. 
 
• You know your valuations?  YES  NO 
• You know the valuations of the participant you are matched with?  YES  NO 
• Your own valuations and his can be different? YES  NO 
• You know who the other participant you are matched with it? YES  NO 
 
 
Imagine you have the following valuations and that you and the participant with whom you are matched 
vote in the way specified below 
 
 Issue 1 Issue 2 Issue 3 
Your valuations 150 250 200 
Your votes 1 3 2 
His votes 3 1 2 
 
 
2. Who wins issue 1?   YOU  HIM  TIES 
3. Who wins issue 2?   YOU  HIM  TIES 
4. Who wins issue 3?   YOU  HIM  TIES 
 
5. How much do you win in issue 1?  ___________ 
6.  How much do you win in issue 2?  ___________ 
7.  How much do you win in issue 3?  ___________ 
 
8. Which is your profit in this period? _________ 
 
9. How many periods will determine your final payment? 
 
10. Your valuations (50, 500, 50), (500, 50, 50), (200, 200, 200) and (200, 250, 150) have the same 
probability 
 
  True 
  False 
 
11. In all periods you are matched to the same person 
 
  True 
  False 
 
12. You know the identity of the participant you are matched with 
 
  True 
  False 
 32 
INSTRUCTIONS (Translated from the original Spanish instructions) 
 
We are grateful for your participation and for your contribution to an Economics Department project. 
The sum of money you will earn during the session will be given privately to you at the end of the 
experiment. From now on (and until the end of the experiment) you cannot talk to any other 
participant. If you have a question, please raise your hand and one of the instructors will answer your 
questions privately. Please do not ask anything aloud! 
 
These experiments consist of 50 periods. The rules are the same for all participants and for all 
periods. At the beginning of each period you will be randomly assigned to another participant with 
whom you will interact. None of you will know who the other participant is. 
 
You and the other participant will decide over a group of three questions. Each question has three 
possible results: 1) you win and s/he loses it; 2) you lose and s/he wins it; and, finally 3) ties occur. 
These results will determine the profits that yourself and the other participant will have in each 
period. Remember that the participant with whom you are interacting in each period is selected 
randomly in each period. 
 
 
1. Information at the beginning of each period 
 
At the beginning of each period you will be told your ‘valuations’ for each issue. You will only know your 
own valuations.  The valuation of each issue specifies how much you earn when you win that issue. These 
valuations are expressed in terms of cents of Euro. 
 
The possible valuations are summarised in the following table. You should consider all possible permutations. 
That is, looking at the first row, it is for instance possible that the valuations for issues 1, 2 and 3 are 50, 500 
and 50 respectively (instead of 500, 50 and 50). As you can see, the valuations are multiples of 50 and add up 
to 600. 
 
Issue 1 Issue 2 Issue 3 
500 50 50 
450 100 50 
400 150 50 
400 100 100 
350 200 50 
350 150 100 
300 250 50 
300 200 100 
300 150 150 
250 250 100 
250 200 150 
200 200 200 
 
The valuations of each participant have been selected randomly by the computer. All possible combinations of 
valuations are equally likely. The valuations of each participant need not be equal; what is more, they will 
usually be different. 
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2. Negotiation 
 
In each period you will be able to communicate with the person you are matched with through a chat window. 
Communication is free except that you are not allowed to identify yourself. If someone identifies himself, he 
will be excluded from the LeeX participants’ list.  
 
At any point during the negotiation, you can send proposals to the person with whom you interact that he 
should accept or reject. Also, you will have to accept or reject his proposals. 
 
 
During the negotiation period, the screen will be divided into three parts: 
 
 
• Chat. In the left part of the screen there’s a window in which you will see the messages that you and 
the person you are matched with have sent from the beginning of the period. In the inferior part of 
such window you can write messages and send pressing enter. 
 
 
• Send proposal. In the upper right part of the screen there’s a window through which you can send 
proposals to the person you are matched with. You have to select whether you win (Won), draw 
(Drawn) or loose (Lost) each of the issues. Once this is done for all the issues, you will be able to send 
your proposal to the person you are interacting with.  
o If the other participant rejects the proposal, you will have the opportunity of 
receiving/sending new proposals.  
o If the other participant accepts the offer, period will be terminated. 
 
 
• Accept o reject a proposal. In the lower right part of the screen there’s a third window through 
which you can accept or reject the proposals that the person with which you interact sends you. This 
proposal will specify the issues that you win (Won), draw (Drawn) or loose (Lost).  
o If you reject the proposal, you will have the opportunity of receiving/sending new proposals.  
o If you accept the proposal, period will be terminated. 
 
 
Remember: Both in the proposals that you send and the ones you receive,  
• Won means that you win and that the person you interact with looses,  
• Drawn means that you and the person you interact with draw,  
• Lost means that you loose and that the person you interact with wins.  
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3. End of the period 
 
The period ends when one of the participants accepts the proposal done by the person he is matched with 
or alter the deadline of 4 minutes. During the maximum amount of time of 4 minutes, both you and the 
person with whom you will interact will be able to send proposals and accept or reject them. In the case 
that none of the participants accepts any proposal before the deadline, the outcome will be a draw in all 
issues and, hence, your payoff will be 300.  
 
In the upper right side of the screen, you can check the second left to exhaust the time given to negotiate.   
 
 
4. Profits in each period 
 
In each period your profits will be equal to the sum of the valuations of all issue you win plus half the 
valuation of the issue you tie. For instance, if in the previous example your valuations are 350, 100 and 150, 
according to the assignation of votes in Section 3 your benefits will be: 350 in issue 1, 0 in issue 2 and 75 (half 
of 150) in issue 3. 
 
 
5. Information at the end of each period 
 
At the end of each period you will receive the following information: 
• Your valuations in each issue 
• The issues you win, lose and tie 
• Your profits 
 
6. Final payment 
 
At the end of the last period, the computer will randomly select 3 periods and you will earn the sum of the 
profits on those periods. Additionally you will be paid three euros for having taken part in the experiment. 
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7. Questionnaire 
 
 
 
13. Circle the correct answer. When you have to negotiate…  
 
• ¿ You know your valuations?  YES  NO 
• ¿You know the valuations of the participant you are matched with?  YES  NO 
• ¿Your own valuations and his can be different? YES  NO 
• ¿You know who the other participant you are matched with it? YES  NO 
 
 
 
 
 
14. Imagine you have the following valuations and that you accepted the following offer: 
 
 Issue 1 Issue 2 Issue 3 
Your Valuations 150 250 200 
 Won Won Won 
Outcome Drawn Drawn Drawn 
 Lost Lost Lost 
 
 
• How much do you win in issue 1?  ___________ 
• How much do you win in issue 2?  ___________ 
• How much do you win in issue 3?  ___________ 
 
• Which is your profit in this period? _________ 
 
• How many periods will determine your final payment? 
 
• Your valuations (50, 500, 50), (500, 50, 50), (200, 200, 200) and (200, 250, 150) have the same 
probability. 
 
   True 
   False 
 
• In all periods you are matched to the same person. 
 
   True 
   False 
 
• If after 4 minutes, neither you nor the participant you are matched with accepted any offer, we 
draw all the issues and each of us gets a payoff of 300. 
 
   True 
   False 
 
 
 
